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Both China and India are adopting information and
communication technologies to facilitate openness and
transparency in their governments, and hence reduce
corruption. Distinctive from their traditional anticor-
ruption approaches, is the innovative e-government
approach an effective solution to corruption in these
two large developing countries? This paper addresses
the question through comparative in-depth interviews
with 44 mid- or senior-level officials in the public sec-
tor in these two countries. The first study of its kind,
our research shows that civil servants in both countries
overall think positively about transparency and technol-
ogy in reducing corruption. However, to what extent
these innovativemeasureswill be effective is conditional
on various factors, such as political willingness, income
inequality, and infrastructure readiness. What is worth
noting is that the Chinese respondents were more pos-
itive regarding the role of transparency, whereas the
Indian respondents were more positive about the role
of technology, which may reflect the different facilita-
tors of corruption and the constraints of anticorruption
in China and India.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Corruption is a global phenomenon that has plaguedmany countries, including China and India,
the two largest emerging economies in the world (Figure 1). Aware of the alarming impact of
corruption on economic development and public governance, the governments of both countries
have pledged to fight corruption seriously, especially in recent years (Sukhtankar & Vaishnav,
2015, p. 79; Tang, Ding, & Xu, 2018). In contrast to the traditional legislative/judicial approaches
in India and party-dominated campaigns in China (Vyas & Wu, 2020), the leveraging of e-
government initiatives to reduce corruption is much more recent and novel. Can this form of
public sector innovation curb corruption in China and India?
This paper sheds light on the question posed above from the perspective of civil servants in the
two countries. Drawing on open-ended structured interviewswith 44mid- or senior-level officials,
in-depth inquiries were made to look into whether or not and if yes, to what extent do they think
e-government initiatives work in reducing corruption, the benefits transparency and technology
can bring about, and the challenges involved in making these initiatives work.
The present paper contributes to the existing literature in four dimensions. First, through inter-
viewing civil servants, it adds important yet understudied ‘insider perspectives’ to the extant
literature on anticorruption, which mainly taps into the opinions of citizens and experts while
ignoring the voices of civil servants who are agents of the state. Second, an in-depth and nuanced
understanding of civil servants’ perceptions of corruption and anticorruption in China and India
contributes to the empirical literature on e-government as a form of public sector innovation for
reducing corruption. The role of e-government in anticorruption has so far largely been dom-
inated by quantitative cross-country analyses or ad hoc case studies. Third, we use a nuanced
approach to study corruption based on insights from civil servants. Our interview questions seek
to understand respondents’ views on the impact of economic (growth and inequality), social (edu-
cation and welfare), and political (ethics and public officials) factors on combating corruption.
This allows us to scrutinize the roles of anticorruption drivers and facilitators, as well as the inter-
actions among them, in a richly contextual manner unattainable in cross-country analyses. Fur-
thermore, we do not intend to study e-government in isolation, although the relationship between
e-government and corruption reduction has been increasingly investigated recently. As elabo-
rated upon later, the subtle differences in civil servants’ perceptions of the role of transparency
and technology in reducing corruption in China and India warrant attention. This issuemay have
profound policy implications. Finally, this paper contributes to the emerging comparative litera-
ture on China and India regarding their anticorruption endeavours (Ang, 2014; Murugkar & Xu,
2012; Vyas &Wu, 2020). Beyond this specific comparative focus, insights generated here may also
be valuable to other developing countries facing similar issues and challenges in relation to cor-
ruption.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the background of our study, as
well as a summary of the gaps in the existing literature. Section 3 describes the qualitative data
andmethodology used in this study, followed by a detailed presentation of this study’s findings in
Section 4. Section 5 discusses the results and presents our conclusions.
2 BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE GAPS
Transparency has long been a focus of anticorruption policies. It has also been combined with
technology to ‘reduce corrupt behaviors by enhancing relationships with citizens and more















































































































China IndiaF IGURE 1 Corruption Perceptions
Index, China and India, 1995–2019
Note. A higher score means a cleaner
government. From 1995 to 2011, the score
ranged between 0 (highly corrupt) and 10
(highly clean); after 2012, the score ranged
between 0 (highly corrupt) and 100 (highly
clean); to have a consistent figure, the
scores between 1995 and 2011 were
multiplied by 10 (Data Source:
https://www.transparency.org)
[Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
effectively controlling and monitoring [public officials]’ (Shim & Eom, 2008, p. 298). This, how-
ever, has only become possible recently, due to technological progress.More specifically, this com-
bination can enhance public governance by ‘increasing public access to information, empower-
ing civil society to oversee the state, enabling citizens to track government decisions and actions
of public employees, and substantially reducing the costs of transparency efforts’ (Nam, 2018,
p. 275). As such, e-government, or the use of information and communication technologies
to enhance government openness (Hameduddin, Fernandez, & Demircioglu, 2020) and trans-
parency, is expected to play a substantial role in tackling corruption (Saleem,Wen, & Khan, 2019).
In otherwords, insofar as public sector innovation is understood as ‘the implementation of a prod-
uct, process, practice, technology, or service that is new to the adopting organization’ (Wegrich,
2019, p. 12; see also Osborne & Brown, 2005), what we see here is the epitome of public sector
innovation endeavouring to combat corruption.
Whether or not and to what extent the anticorruption effect of e-government has been real-
ized is a question for empirical investigation. Despite its emergence and steady accumulation, the
empirical literature as it stands has gaps in the following two important issues.
The first issue concerns large-scale cross-country studies of corruption; in-depth and small-N
studies are called for. Themajority of empirical investigations use quantitative approaches to anal-
yse cross-country data. Although the positive anticorruption impact of e-government is observed
in these studies (e.g. Anderson, 2009; Choi, 2014; Kim, 2014; Shim & Eom, 2008), offering encour-
aging insight, what is presented is largely decontextualized.
Zooming into particular countries’ experiences is crucial in gaining an understanding of anti-
corruption in different contexts and generating relevant policy implications. For example both
China and India are documented as increasingly adopting e-government initiatives (Chen &
Aklikokou, 2019; Gupta & Jana, 2003; Holliday & Yep, 2005; Kumar & Best, 2006; Zhou, 2004).
However, the link between e-government and corruption reduction has rarely been thoroughly
investigated beyond ad hoc case studies (Bhatnagar, 2004, on India) or general discussions (Fan,
Zhang, & Yue, 2009, on China). Therefore, to help researchers and policymakers better antici-
pate the opportunities and challenges presented in adopting different anticorruption measures,
a more in-depth and nuanced understanding is needed. It is necessary to explore whether or not
and to what extent e-governments can work. More importantly, an examination of the reason-
ing behind e-government is urgently needed to supplement the overall picture presented by the
previous literature.
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The second issue concerns whose opinions get picked up and at whose cost. With a few excep-
tions (Graycar, 2014; Jackson&Smith, 1995; van derWal, Graycar, &Kelly, 2016), the primary focus
of the literature has been on citizens (CMS, 2018; Li, Gong, & Xiao, 2016; Su, 2020; Yu, Chen, &
Lin, 2013) and experts’ opinions (Song & Cheng, 2012; Thompson & Shah, 2005). Most of these
extant inquiries have thus fallen short of fully capturing public officials’ perceptions. However,
these groups are not negligible, as they are themost important ‘insiders’ regarding anticorruption
policies and measures, both as the implementers of such policies as well as their targets. This is
particularly the case in many developing countries. Emphasizing the perceptions of ‘outsiders’
at the cost of ‘insiders’, the literature on reducing bureaucratic corruption can currently offer
only a partial understanding of the nature of corruption, as well as anticorruption measures and
approaches (see Gans-Morse et al., 2018; Sukhtankar & Vaishnav, 2015). In contrast, Li, Lien, Wu,
and Zhao (2017) view public officials as important implementers of anticorruption policies. They
use the panel data of provincial anticorruption agency heads from 2000 to 2012 to show that both
their formal and informal powers help enhance the number of corruption cases brought under
investigation. We are not examining objective evidence of the effectiveness of e-government on
anticorruption due to the lack of comparative data in China and India. However, a more in-depth
understanding of civil servants’ perceptions is still deemed both timely and necessary.
3 DATA ANDMETHODOLOGY
We adopted a qualitative approach to effectively address the question of whether or not and if
yes, to what extent e-government as a form of public sector innovation, is a solution to corrup-
tion in China and India. More specifically, we conducted exploratory interviews using a set of
open-ended questions for public officials from one Chinese province and one Indian state. These
geographic areas are considered to be average in terms of economic development within their
respective countries. The qualitative approach is deemed appropriate as it allows us to conduct an
in-depth exploration of both the perceptions of officials as important yet long-neglected ‘insiders’
and the reasoning behind these perceptions. These elements are rarely investigated in quantitative
studies. Similarly, the open-ended questions suit the purpose of our research, as the responses can
‘provide detail about perceptions, opinions, personal experiences, and deeply held beliefs’ (Julien,
2012, p. 2).
In China, interview questions were distributed to 30 mid-career civil servants during their
career training in a renowned local university. They were asked to provide written answers within
1–2 hr in the fall semester of the academic year 2017–2018. During the same period, in India,
the interview questions were sent via email to targeted civil servants and politicians through
the connections of one of the authors. Although a relatively new qualitative method (Gibson,
2017), email interviews are nevertheless a suitable alternative to face-to-face interviews. They are
more convenient to arrange and easy to complete, while still allowing questions and answers
to be well thought out (Burns, 2010; James, 2016). These advantages are particularly relevant
in our case, as the sensitivity of the topic renders traditional face-to-face interviews difficult to
operationalize, particularly in India. Among our 22 potential respondents, two were politicians
(one from the ruling party – BJP, and the other from the opposition party) and the remain-
ing were officials from the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) and Provincial Civil Service
(PCS). Both politicians, along with the 12 IAS/PCS officials of different ranks in the government,
responded.
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Interview questions for Chinese respondents were written in Chinese, whereas the ones dis-
tributed to Indian interviewees were in English. The list of questions are comparable across the
two versions, which have been validated by experts in anticorruption research. However, the exact
sequence andwording of the questions varied slightly, to capture the nuances of the two countries’
respective contexts. All interviews were anonymous, in the hope that it would encourage respon-
dents to be more open and frank in sharing their opinions. The survey results indicated that, in
both China and India, respondents were quite articulate in regard to the sensitive questions. The
complete list of interview questions is available from the authors upon request.
We followed a purposive sampling strategy. We aimed to understand the perceptions of corrup-
tion and anticorruption among mid- or senior-level officials. Therefore, certain characteristics of
the interviewees, such as familiarity with ethics management and anticorruption, were empha-
sized. Purposive sampling had therefore been chosen when we implemented the project (Stocke-
mer, 2019).
Our ability to generalize findings from this study might be limited, owing to the small and
nonrandom sample. It is, however, worth noting that generalizability to the population is not the
main purpose of this qualitative study. The main aim is to gain some first-hand, in-depth insights
into the public officials’ perceptions regarding e-government, as well as other factors that may
reduce the incidence of corruption. This study also aims to compare how and to what extent their
opinions are similar or different across the two countries. Hence, this target population allows
us to address our research question in a manner that adds fresh insights to the existing literature
along the lines identified in the previous section. The limitation in the number of respondentsmay
thus be partly compensated for by the richness of the information provided by these respondents.
Similarly, a previous study explored the challenges in adopting e-government initiatives through
the interviews of 26 government officials in the United States (Lee & Kim, 2007).
Questions on the role of transparency, technology, and other factors that may contribute to the
reduction of corruption (see Table A1) are situated in the middle part of the question list. The
respondents were first asked to evaluate the overall effectiveness of anticorruption initiatives and
the quality of anticorruption institutions. These questions are followed by respondents’ sugges-
tions of solutions for tackling the issue of corruption. As technology and transparency are the two
key elements in e-government initiatives, the questions we asked are as follows:
1. What are your views on transparent government (including e-government)? Please comment
on both availability and accessibility.
2. To what extent can the introduction of technology to citizens be effective in combating corrup-
tion?
Other anticorruption drivers and facilitators included in the questionnaires were based on an
extensive reading of the literature on corruption with specific relevance to the two countries,
including two recent syntheses of evidence (Sukhtankar & Vaishnav, 2015; Tang et al., 2018). In
other words, there have been attempts in the literature to link these elements with the levels and
prevalence of corruption, and such elements are emerging in the contexts of China and India. In
general, they fall into the following categories (which may be interrelated in reality): economic,
social, and political factors. In all categories, questions were asked in the following way: ‘How
do you evaluate the role of . . . ?’; ‘Can . . . reduce the level of corruption?’; ‘Does . . . have a role to
play in corruption?’; and so forth (Table A1). Instead of seeking binary ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers, the
questions were structured in an open-ended manner that allowed the respondents to write down
their thoughts and comments in detail.
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Once collected, the interview data were coded in two stages, using the software NVivo (version
11.0). In the first stage, knownas ‘open coding’, the key concepts and ideaswere coded after reading
and rereading the interview answers. The option of ‘coding in NVivo’ was also used when the
researchers were unsure about which umbrella certain words or phrases should be put under.
The second stage used ‘axial coding’, in which different concepts and ideas identified in the
first stage were regrouped based on the relationships discerned from this process. Although the
literature on research design also recommends a third stage of analysis called ‘selective coding’
(Babbie, 2012, p. 401), it was deemed unnecessary, as our data had already reached saturation after
performing the second stage of coding.
Across all anticorruption drivers and facilitators that were identified, the responsesmainly cov-
ered three aspects: overall (dis)agreement, further elaborations, and factor-specific additions. In
terms of an overall agreement on whether or not some factors were effective in reducing inci-
dences of corruption, there was a fairly clear distinction between those holding the opinion that
theywere ‘useful at least to some extent’ versus those who dismissed them as ‘of limited or no use’.
In some cases, a factor is not necessarily linked to corruption. For some types of anticorruption
drivers and facilitators, respondents answered that ‘it depends’ and even elucidated both the con-
ditions under which they would work and those under which they would not. All answers were
therefore categorized under the four labels mentioned above. In further explaining their percep-
tions, amore nuanced picture emerged inwhich respondents elaborated on themerits, challenges,
and pitfalls of the drivers and facilitators used to make anticorruption strategies effective. Finally,
a residual category was created for each anticorruption driver. For instance, when analysing eco-
nomic factors, ‘using a high salary to mitigate corruption (gaoxin yanglian)’ was mentioned as a
particular policy solution.
The responses from the two countries were analysed separately in the initial stages of the anal-
ysis. However, the similar interview structure and the way in which the questionnaires were
designed ensured that the responses were largely comparable. The analysis in the next section
is based on the same three aspects, which resulted from the coding, as mentioned in the last para-
graph.
4 FINDINGS
This section reports how the respondents in the public sector inChina and India described theway
they think about the role of e-government in reducing corruption. Section 4.1 directly compares
their views about the effectiveness of transparency and technology, the two essential components
of e-government initiatives. More than half of our sample in both countries was positive about
the anticorruption potential of e-government through the increase of the cost of corruption or the
empowering of the citizenry. However, two interesting nuances within the responses are worth
highlighting. First, beyond the overall acknowledgment of the positive anticorruption role of e-
government, the exact weight of this acknowledgment on transparency and modern technology
is slightly different between the two groups of respondents in China and India, respectively. This
difference is further explored in Section 4.2. Second, the co-existence of general optimism and cau-
tious reservations are observed in other anticorruption drivers and facilitators, which is shown in
Section 4.3. Taken together, our findings generate a broad and nuanced picture of anticorruption
based on ‘insider perceptions’, which has rarely been investigated in the literature so far.
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4.1 Insider perceptions of e-government in India and China
A large percentage of the Chinese respondents (22/30) agreed that transparency would be useful
in reducing corruption, the potential of which can be fulfilled by ‘reducing under-the-table deal-
ings’, ‘streamlining procedures’, and ‘increasing the cost of corruption’. Fundamentally, respon-
dents believed that this would enhance the supervisory role of the public. As the minority here,
three respondents held the opinion that ‘it depends’. They voiced both optimism and concern, and
were joined by another five respondents who stated outright that transparency has a limited or no
role.Most of these concernswere expressed on the grounds that current government initiatives on
transparencymay be ‘superficial’ or ‘half-hearted’ at best, in which information is ‘filtered at mul-
tiple levels [before reaching the public]’. Accordingly, ‘those having capabilities and [influential
and powerful] backgrounds may remain unaffected’. When reflecting on a certain demographic
not used to the internet (e.g. the elderly), one respondent voiced that such initiatives might even
be harmful.
On the Indian side, 43% of the respondents (6/14) did not have any comments to make, but
more than half of the remaining respondents thought that transparency plays a positive role. The
reasons raised, such as ‘citizen communication and empowerment’ (and, hence, ‘public support’),
were not substantially different from those expressed by their Chinese counterparts. In addition,
they mentioned the ‘elimination of middlemen’, ‘growth and progress’, and ‘political stability’.
A quarter of the remaining respondents did not think that transparency is useful and were
joined by another respondentwho argued that ‘it depends’, given both themerits and challenges of
e-government. The concerns they raisedwere quite different from those on the Chinese side, how-
ever. Although Chinese respondents mainly questioned the sincerity of government willingness,
Indian respondents were more preoccupied with capacity constraints during the implementation
stage, such as the ‘lack of infrastructure and officer training’, highlighting this issue, ‘especially in
villages and remote areas’. Without solving these problems simultaneously, if not first, it would
take a long time before transparency and e-government initiatives could become effective.
Technology,which is related to the above inquiry into the role of transparency, is the other factor
in the agenda of leveraging e-government to fight corruption. Compared with those who thought
favourably about transparency, the percentage of Chinese respondents who felt positively about
modern technology was slightly lower than that of Indian respondents (17/30). Most comments
still centred on enabling citizens and public vigilance. An additional merit mentioned by the
respondents was that modern technology also ‘offers a convenient channel for reporting wrong-
doings’. However, 23.3% of the Chinese respondents (7/30) thought modern technology was of
limited or no use, whereas the answers of another 16.7% (5/30) were labelled as ‘it depends’, given
both the advantages and shortfalls. One reason for this was that the ‘means of corruption are also
ever-evolving’; hence, the use of technology could ‘drive corruptive behaviour to be more discreet
and underground’. Another respondent opined that the current problem may not be to do with
clues or reporting, but rather that the actions taken afterward are inadequate. The rise of false,
biased, or partial reporting may also have serious implications. It was with these concerns that
two of the respondents commented that ‘technology is a double-edged sword’, whereas another
respondent argued that the effectiveness of technology ‘depends on the openness of government
information as well as the media’ and accordingly cautioned that ‘anticorruption cannot entirely
rely on public vigilance’.
In contrast, 10 out of the 14 Indian respondents did feel that modern technology plays a positive
role; half of them linked this to the common rationales they had commented on earlier regarding
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transparency, such as citizen vigilance and the removal of middlemen. The remaining four, who
either had reservations or did not agree at all, brought up the argument that ‘the introduction of
technology to an uneducated population is not effective’. This was similar to the reservation of
one Chinese respondent mentioned above regarding the introduction of transparency initiatives
to those who are not yet used to the internet.
4.2 Different weights on transparency and technology
It can be seen from the above analysis that the overall level of agreement that transparency and
technology would be useful, at least to some extent, was high on both sides. The positive acknowl-
edgment of this innovative method, as well as other anticorruption drivers and facilitators, which
will be elaborated upon later, pinpoints that the government (i.e. the administrative branch) has
the potential to play a much more active role in both China and India. Traditional anticorruption
approaches, such as relying on campaign-style dominated party organs (Fu, 2015; Lang, 2017) or
legislative and judicial branches, which tackle some urgent issues, should be reconsidered. Given
that these dominant anticorruption approaches lead to mixed results (Zhang & Kim, 2017; Zhu,
Huang, & Zhang, 2019, on China; Paramahamsa, 2017; Wolf, 2017, on India) and can be politically
controversial at times (Li, 2019; Mahmood, 2017), innovative approaches and policy mixes may
well be alternatives worth considering to better signal commitment and improve the effective-
ness of anticorruption.
However, given the substantially different socioeconomic and political contexts of the two
countries, the effectiveness of transparency and technology may manifest itself in a much more
nuanced manner. This can also be interrelated with other anticorruption drivers and facilitators,
according to the civil servants we interviewed.
From the perspective of our Chinese respondents, transparency is more critical for anticorrup-
tion than technology, though they cautioned that transparency needs to be analysed in greater
depth for it to work toward reducing corruption. Indian respondents were more enthusiastic
regarding technology than transparency initiatives. It is possible that existing and more tradi-
tional forms of engagement with transparency (other than e-government) are already higher in
the Indian context, with its renowned right-to-information campaign resulting in the 2005 Right
to Information (RTI) Act. In contrast, traditional transparency initiatives in China are much less
proactive. For instance, one of themost prominentmanifestations of transparency, theRegulations
of the People’s Republic of China on Open Government Information, adopted in 2008 and revised in
2019, is only a government regulation, rather than a law. The limited effectiveness of transparency
with regard to reining in corruption is also reflected in the reservations of some Chinese respon-
dents, whose concerns over its effectiveness were mainly about whether or not the government
is sincerely committed to being transparent. Indian officials, on the other hand, pointed out that
better education and improved infrastructure are crucial for technology to work in combating
corruption.
4.3 What corruption is (not): A broader picture
Different perceptions of the roles and limitations of transparency versus technology further shed
light on the nuanced understanding of the nature of corruption held by Chinese and Indian civil
servants. The respondents did not consider this problem to be purely economic. Only half of our
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Chinese respondents (15/30) agreed that economic development would help bring down corrup-
tion, as it could ‘reduce demand for corruption’, ‘raise levels of civility’, and ‘benefit the citizenry’.
More than a quarter of the respondents (8/30) questioned the effectiveness of this association.
Some argued that corruption is more a social or psychological phenomenon (rather than eco-
nomic) by contrasting the current period with the Mao era, which they believed to have a lower
prevalence of corruption, despite greater overall poverty. Some argued that the reason for corrup-
tion is insteadmore institutional (i.e. the inadequacy of supervision). Some even believed that eco-
nomic growth would elicit more corruption or would not mitigate it, at least in the initial phases
of growth. The remaining respondents (7/30) argued that corruption and economic growth are
not necessarily related.
On the Indian side, the number of respondents who recognized the corruption-reducing role
of economic development was equal to the number of those who disagreed (6/14). For the for-
mer, besides similar arguments to those raised by their Chinese counterparts (e.g. that economic
development would reduce the demand for corruption), other mechanisms cited included ‘block-
ing themeans of keeping and spending blackmoney’ and ‘promotingmarket competition through
decentralization’. Those who disagreed presented a more institutional perspective, in which ‘only
proper implementation and strict punishment will solve the problem’. Other respondents argued
that ‘rich people may demandmore from poor people’, or that the ‘level of economic development
[that can reduce corruption]’ has not yet been reached.
Compared with e-government and other factors that may reduce corruption, the number of
respondents who believed simply increasing the level of economic development would reduce
corruption was the lowest in both countries. This is quite different from the typical Western view
of corruption as mainly an economic issue (and, hence, deregulation andmarket-oriented reform
as the typical ameliorative policy suggestions; Bertot, Jaeger, & Grimes, 2010, p. 265).
Beyond this agreement, there were substantial differences regarding the nature of corruption.
For the Chinese respondents, it was more about the distribution of development benefits in terms
of income and social welfare. For the Indian respondents, it wasmore about the development level
and accessibility of social services to the disadvantaged. This also largely echoes the development
status of the two countries. According to World Bank statistics, India’s poverty headcount ratio
has been higher than that of China since the 2000s. In contrast, China’s income gap between the
rich and the poor is more alarming.
For Chinese respondents, income disparity was one of the cruxes of corruption; a vast majority
of respondents (27/30) acknowledged that it plays a role. This is also in line with income disparity
and corruption being ranked as the top concerns of ordinary Chinese citizens (Gong &Wu, 2012;
Han & Whyte, 2009). Although (increased levels of) economic development reduce the demand
for corruption, several respondents mentioned that inequality would raise this demand by mak-
ing poor officials feel unfairly treated. One respondent even referred to the concept of class strat-
ification, as civil servants are not compensated sufficiently. Although the percentage of Indian
respondents who felt the same was lower (8/14), the mechanisms cited for the link between dis-
parity and corruption were similarly along the lines of increased demand for corruption. As one
respondent put it, disparity means that ‘people try to compete with others’; ‘to win this horse race,
they go to any extent of corruption to fulfil their needs’.
Only two of the Chinese respondents thought that income disparity is not necessarily relevant
to corruption. One felt that a certain amount of disparity is reasonable; ‘otherwise, there would
be no motivation for socioeconomic development’ (he did, however, recognize the importance of
‘preventing [individuals from] becoming rich through corruptive means’). Another respondent
rejected the possibility of ‘venturing into corruption just to keep up with the salary scales of
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colleagues in urban areas or more senior officials’ himself, whereas a third of the respon-
dents talked about ‘using high salaries to mitigate corruption/cultivate frugality’ as a solution
(see Wu, 2014a, 2014b, on civil service salary and anticorruption in China), without directly
commenting on inequality.
In contrast, the percentage of such thinking on the Indian side was higher (6/14). Some held a
pessimistic view that ‘all, irrespective of salary, demand bribes’. Another respondent first gave
an ambiguous answer of ‘could be’ (i.e. income disparity could have a role to play in breed-
ing corruption), but then argued that such issues could not be corrected, as ‘the manager and
the clerk cannot be paid similarly (which means that egalitarianism also harms civil service
management)’. Still, others pointed to poor ethical standards as the core issue (this point will
be elaborated upon later). Additional negative comments included the idea that disparity ‘will
lead to crime, not corruption’, which sheds light on the complexities of the impact of income
inequality.
In a similar vein, 90% of our Chinese respondents generally agreed that social welfare programs
are useful in reducing corruption. In addition to explicitly mentioning the reduction of inequal-
ity, they brought up other mechanisms through which welfare programsmay work, including the
‘increase of satisfaction and feelings of happiness’ and ‘constraints on the opportunities for and
benefits of corruptive behaviours’. One respondent added a further qualification that the moni-
toring of such programs is nevertheless needed in practice. The very few remaining respondents
conceded that welfare programs ‘may not be the most fundamental solution’, though they may
‘reduce the sympathy felt by the public toward corrupt officials’.
Only two of the Indian respondents expressed outright disagreement with the positive role of
welfare programs in combating corruption. They worried that ‘people still will bribe to get things
done’. There were even respondents who saw ‘welfare programs [as] a source of corruption’. Two
more respondents gave an ambivalent opinion of ‘could/maybe’, whereas another four respon-
dents mentioned key anticorruption drivers other than welfare programs, including education
(awareness and literacy) programs, firm leadership by the government (with more severe pun-
ishments for offenders based on the severity of the case), and e-government (digitalization). For
the remaining respondents (6/14) who acknowledged the positive role of welfare programs, most
illustrated their points with concrete examples from education, welfare subsidies, and various
other central and state government schemes, without elaborating on why they thought the pro-
grams were successful. One respondent nonetheless cautioned that welfare and other income
redistributive programs must be practical and accessible to be effective.
The perception of educational attainment is the second dimension of social development that
we examined. A slightly lower percentage of Chinese respondents (21/30) believed educational
attainment played a positive role in corruption reduction, in contrast to their perceptions on
income inequality, although the rationales mentioned were quite diverse. They included ‘civic
attitude’, ‘democratic awareness/awareness of rights’, and the ‘raising of citizens’ calibre’, just to
name a few. Some respondents believed that better educated citizens might play a better monitor-
ing role. On the Indian side, nearly 70% of respondents (9/14) thought similarly. Reasons they cited
include ‘awareness of right and wrong’, ‘citizens’ rights and responsibilities’, and ‘ethical values
or behaviour’, are not so different from those of their Chinese counterparts. Likewise, a similar
percentage of respondents (around 30%) in these two countries did not think that education nec-
essarily has a role to play in combating corruption. Some argued that ‘being educated’ does not
mean ‘having a high [moral] calibre’. As will be seen in the next paragraph, these two concepts
were often conflated, especially in the Chinese context. Others commented that corruption also
has to do with the broader social environment.
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Finally, regarding the political dimension, our results suggest that the low ethics of officials are
the most important root cause of corruption, according to Indian respondents. The Chinese view
was more mixed. Regarding perceptions of the ethical standards of politicians/officials, among
our Chinese respondents, 40% (12/30) gave an ambiguous answer (‘it depends’); being an offi-
cial in China does not necessarily indicate a high ethical standard. In other words, the two are
not necessarily related. The rest of the respondents, who gave clear-cut opinions, were equally
divided between seeing officials as having higher ethical standards and believing otherwise. Even
amongst the former, the reasons raised were sometimes not that closely and strictly linked to
ethics. By saying that officials ‘are social elites’, ‘have experienced higher education’, and ‘are [in
their positions] after several rounds of selection’, they were indeed referring to officials’ education
levels, social status, and job prestige, rather than their ethical standards. Some of these pointswere
refuted by those who did not perceive officials as having a higher moral calibre. For example, sev-
eral respondents mentioned that ‘morality is not necessarily linked to the rankings of officials’; it
may not have any connection at all with whether or not a person is an official. Moreover, respon-
dents with the latter opinion cautioned that, when ‘cadre selection criteria are not transparent and
based on seniority [rather than performance]’, they may even create many officials with low eth-
ical standards. There were also more cynical views that ‘only very few officials have integrity and
high moral standards. However, such officials are not favoured by either their seniors or juniors’.
Unlike the Chinese respondents, who expressed diverse opinions on ethical standards, Indian
respondents almost universally ranked the ethical standards of politicians/officials in the ‘low’ cat-
egory. Indeed, their sentiments were either cynical (‘politicians try to project a very moral image
of themselves in public, but when it comes to actual life, it is the reverse’) or strong (‘this field
requires a focused anticorruption drive’), if not both. Perhaps the only silver lining in the unequiv-
ocal laments was the brief statement that ‘things are changing for the better’, made by the same
respondent who accused politicians and officials with low ethical standards of being the main
source of corruption.
Another political dimension explored was whether or not the appointment of important posi-
tions would cause chain reactions of corruption (i.e. officials getting involved in corruption
because their senior officials are corrupt). Eighty percent of the Chinese respondents answered
‘yes’ to this question, with the mention of positive effects on corruption (i.e. appointing ‘clean’
officials makes the government less corrupt) slightly more frequent than that of negative effects.
The remaining few respondents were less positive in their answers. In particular, some respon-
dents did not believe that any chain reactions exist. Instead, they argued that corruption is ‘too
institutional for any individual to intervene forcefully’ or that ‘it is less about the position than the
person’. That is in fighting corruption, institutional anticorruption arrangements are much more
instrumental than attempts to prevent individual corrupt officials from catalysing more corrup-
tion.
A slightly higher percentage of Indian respondents (12/14) agreed that there is a chain effect,
although very few elaborated further on this opinion. A positive effect was mentioned only once:
‘If appointments to important positions are properly made, then we will have honest people
who will combat corruption’. Some negative comments counterbalanced this. For instance, some
respondents stated that corrupt officials may ‘help their own people take undue advantage most
of the time’. Similarly, ‘if corrupt officials are in important positions, then it will increase corrup-
tion’. One respondent made a further call that ‘all appointments should be [made] on merit’. Only
two of the Indian respondents stated otherwise.
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5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Public sector innovation is broadly considered as necessary to solve economic and social problems
(seeDemircioglu, 2019, p. 1). As rampant corruption remains a severe problem inmany parts of the
developingworld, the anticorruption potential of e-government innovation has increasingly inter-
ested scholars, practitioners, and policymakers alike. Unlike earlier studies, which either present
a cross-country picture or single case studies, this paper is the first of its kind to examine the
potential and limitations of using e-government as an innovative anticorruption measure from
the perspective of public officials in two of the world’s largest developing countries. This question
is further explored alongside their perceptions on other anticorruption endeavours, which not
only yields important insights into the nature of corruption in these two countries, but also sheds
light on important policy measures with regard to how corruption can be better tackled.
In addition to enriching the extant literature through an in-depth exploration of government
officials’ ‘insider perspectives’, the findings also yield practical implications for anticorruption pol-
icymaking in the two countries, as well as other developing countries facing similar challenges.
As can be observed from our analysis, respondents still had concerns and reservations, even with
regard to facilitators that received the most endorsement for their usefulness in reducing corrup-
tion (e.g. reducing income inequality in the Chinese context or strengthening moral education
for public officials in the Indian context). In other words, none of the anticorruption drivers and
facilitators would suffice if used alone. The introduction of e-government is no exception. Our
findings echo evidence from cross-country studies, in that the extent to which e-government will
be an effective anticorruption measure (or improve public governance) varies based on the polit-
ical, economic, and cultural conditions of a country (Ho & Im, 2015; Nam, 2018; van der Wal &
Demircioglu, 2020; Zhang, 2015).
The limitations of individual policy measures are by no means a problem exclusive to fighting
corruption. Indeed, nearly all institutional arrangements would face a distinctive set of imper-
fections if used individually (Wu & Ramesh, 2014). Therefore, the task underlying anticorruption
governance is to devise a policy mix that can synergize the merits of different instruments while
minimizing, if not cancelling out, their limitations.
Just as corruption is perceived as a complex socioeconomic problem (rather than as a purely
economic phenomenon), the policymix should be comprehensive andmuch broader thanmerely
focusing on vigilance, monitoring, and punishment aspects wherein the above measures primar-
ily view public officials as policy targets. The motivations of public officials are complex. As men-
tioned by Leong and Howlett (2017), besides avoiding blame, they aim to claim credit and retain
their legitimacy and credibility, which the adoption of egovernment innovation possibly tackles.
In terms of innovative modern technologies, their adoption may require that the accessibility and
quality of education be improved simultaneously to enhance the usage of such technologies. These
complementarities were brought up by the respondents in various parts of the interviews. Given
that, in our interviews, individual categories of factors were scrutinized one by one, without over-
arching questions linking them together, the interaction effects of different drivers and facilitators
are beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, it remains a topic worth further exploration, in
order to identify one or more viable policy mix(es) that could be used to combat corruption.
In summary, adopting information and communication technologies to facilitate openness
and transparency in government is already a nascent and emerging innovation in the fight
against corruption in China and India. Although cross-country studies suggest that this should
be a promising method for reducing corruption, insider perspectives in the Chinese and Indian
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contexts indicate that a more nuanced approach to fighting corruption and improving openness
and transparency in government is needed.
Through a qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews with 44 officials, this paper investigated
in detail these perceptions held by public officials in the two countries, a critical aspect that few
studies in the literature have scrutinized. Our results suggest that, although respondents in both
countries believe that various measures – be they e-government or economic and political ones –
can be useful in tackling corruption, none of themwould be sufficient when used as a standalone
measure. Therefore, they would need to be supplemented with other measures.
The perceived limitations of each of these measures in turn reflect how civil servants in the two
countries interpret the nature of corruption. The majority of the Chinese civil servants and their
Indian counterparts viewed corruption as more than an economic issue, which differs substan-
tially from the dominant view in Western countries, which is also held by international orga-
nizations (Bertot et al., 2010, p. 265). However, for China, the priority in reducing corruption
is strengthening political commitment to e-government initiatives and, more broadly, reducing
income inequality in society. In contrast, the obstacle to e-government effectively reining in cor-
ruption in India manifests more in the form of a lack of essential services, such as infrastructure
and education in remote rural areas. Such complementarities and interrelations of different anti-
corruption drivers and facilitators deserve to be contextualized and clarified more systematically,
to facilitate more well-rounded policy design and implementation. This will allow the full real-
ization of such policies’ potential. For instance, future researchmay further differentiate different
types of corruption (Graycar, 2015) and investigate what kind or stage of e-government arrange-
ments (Moon, 2002) is most effective in combating these various forms of corruption. This paper
thus serves as a valuable starting point on which these inquiries can build.
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APPENDIX





E-government Transparency What are your views on transparent government (including
e-government)? Please comment on both availability and accessibility.
Technology To what extent can the introduction of technology to citizens be
effective in combating corruption?




Does income disparity have a role to play in corruption? How can we
handle this situation?
Social Education Does the improvement of the educational attainment of citizens act as a
tool to combat corruption?
Welfare programs Can there be any social welfare programs (including but not limited to
health care, social assistance to the poor, and retirement protection)
that can help combat corruption?




Do appointments to important positions lead to the chain reactions of
corrupt practices?
